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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
This is an appeal by defendant Kmart from a judgment 
entered on a $650,000 jury verdict in favor of plaintiff 
Carmelita Elcock ("Elcock") for personal injuries and 
economic loss that she suffered as the result of a slip and 
fall at a Kmart store in Frederiksted, U.S. Virgin Islands. 
Kmart concedes its liability and acknowledges that Elcock's 
fall caused her some quantum of harm. However, Kmart 
challenges several evidentiary rulings that relate to the 
proof of Elcock's damages, and contends that the $650,000 
award, which consisted of $300,000 for pain and suffering 
and $350,000 for loss of future earnings and earning 
capacity, was excessive. 
 
The most important questions on appeal relate to the 
testimony of Dr. Chester Copemann, who was proffered by 
Elcock, inter alia, as an expert in vocational rehabilitation, 
and whose vocational rehabilitation presentation 
substantially informed the large award for loss of future 
earnings and earning capacity. We conclude that there 
should have been a Daubert hearing prior to the receipt of 
Copemann's testimony, and that because there was no 
such hearing, his testimony cannot stand. In the course of 
reaching this conclusion, we decide that the District Court 
did not abuse its discretion either in qualifying Copemann 
as an expert or in limiting the scope of cross-examination 
concerning Copemann's prior acts of criminal misconduct. 
With respect to the testimony of Dr. Bernard Pettingill, an 
 
                                2 
  
economist put on by Elcock to assess her lost future 
earnings, we conclude that his opinion should have been 
excluded because his economic model relied on 
assumptions wholly without foundation in the record. In 
the absence of the testimony of these two critical witnesses, 
and given the inability of Elcock's other witnesses to act as 
surrogates therefor, the economic loss portion of the jury 
verdict, which rests on this inadmissible evidence, must be 
set aside, and a new trial granted. 
 
Kmart also submits that both the economic and non- 
economic portions of the jury award were excessive and 
thus should be remitted. We do not reach Kmart's 
remittitur arguments. Because we find that the jury's 
tainted economic damage award was not clearly distinct 
and separate from the non-economic portion of its damage 
verdict, a new trial must be had on all aspects of the 
damage award. We do, however, for the guidance of the 
District Court on remand, reject Kmart's contention that 
Elcock failed to present sufficient evidence to show that her 
damages, particularly her permanent injuries, were caused 
by her slip and fall, as we are satisfied that there is 
sufficient evidence in the record to support such a finding. 
We thus affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for a 
new trial on the issue of damages. 
 
I. Facts and Procedural History 
 
On August 12, 1995, Elcock and her husband went to 
the Frederiksted Kmart to purchase mints. While shopping, 
Elcock slipped and fell on a waxy substance that had built 
up on the floor. Elcock reported her fall to customer 
service, and a Kmart employee placed her in a wheelchair. 
Elcock told Kmart representatives that she had injured her 
back and right leg and was in excruciating pain. Kmart 
offered her the opportunity to visit a physician of her choice 
at its expense, but informed her that it would pay for only 
one visit. 
 
Elcock declined the offer and visited her own doctor, Dr. 
Arakere B. Prasad. Prasad diagnosed her as suffering from 
a lumbar sprain. Because Elcock complained of low back 
pain and cramps in her right leg, Prasad prescribed 
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painkillers for her. Elcock, however, never used the 
prescription. Prasad stated that Elcock's back and leg 
injuries would interfere with her flexibility and cause her 
pain, and that her injury was "an ongoing thing. It may be 
forever." 
 
Elcock sought a second opinion from an orthopedist, Dr. 
Claudius Henry. During her initial visit, four days after the 
slip and fall, Henry also diagnosed Elcock with a low back 
sprain. He found limitation in Elcock's range of motion, as 
well as tenderness and irritation in her right leg and back 
"in the right LV-3 which is lumbar third to LV-1 which is 
the paraspinal along the spine on the right side." He 
considered both symptoms to be indicative of nerve root 
irritation arising out of an injury to muscles, ligaments, 
and the outer portion of the disc area in Elcock's back. 
Henry prescribed physical therapy, x-rays, and an anti- 
inflammatory drug, and recommended that Elcock limit her 
physical activity. The x-rays revealed that she had"minimal 
spurring [i.e., the accretion of calcium deposits in] the 
anterior portion of the vertebral bodies of the lower back." 
In Henry's opinion, this preexisting condition made her 
more susceptible to suffering a low-back sprain when she 
slipped and fell. 
 
During a second visit, Henry diagnosed Elcock with 
resolving post-traumatic radiculopathy. Radiculopathy is 
often caused by a herniated intervertebral disc. Henry 
noted that Elcock suffered pain and nerve irritation, and 
complained of a limited range of motion in her back and 
right leg. He described these injuries as "chronic," meaning 
that they could "exist off and on for an indefinite period," 
possibly for the rest of Elcock's life. The two visits with 
Henry took place over a span of seven months. During this 
time and in the months thereafter, Elcock also saw a Dr. 
Ali once a month; Ali had been treating her for an unrelated 
diabetes condition. As evidenced by Ali's notes, Elcock 
never made any mention of her back and leg pain to him. 
 
Elcock claimed that the injuries she received as a result 
of the fall profoundly impacted her life. At the time of the 
accident, Elcock was fifty-one years old and self-employed 
as a salesperson for Mary Kay Cosmetics. Elcock contended 
that she suffered extreme and uninterrupted physical pain, 
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as well as depression that often caused her to cry until her 
eyes became swollen. She reasoned that this depression 
arose in large part from the fact that her debilitating 
injuries affected other aspects of her life. Elcock testified 
that she had lost most of her Mary Kay business, and that, 
as a result, her income fell from the $5,744 she earned in 
1995 to $1,070 in 1996. Mary Kay sells its products 
through a force of salespeople organized in a pyramid 
structure. The salespeople earn commissions and prizes on 
their sales and the sales of those they recruit into their 
personal pyramids. Elcock was thus not only responsible 
for selling Mary Kay's products, but for recruiting and 
maintaining a subordinate sales force. She stated that her 
injuries interfered with her ability to perform all of these 
functions. 
 
Seventeen months after the slip and fall, Elcock visited 
Dr. Sylvia Payne, a San Juan-based specialist in physical 
medicine and rehabilitation, so that Payne might give an 
opinion as to Elcock's medical condition in relation to the 
fall for purposes of this litigation. Payne found that Elcock 
suffered from lumbar myositis (inflammation of the lower 
back muscles, characterized by pain, tenderness, and 
sometimes spasms in the affected area) and from two 
"trigger points" in the gluteus maximus muscle. Trigger 
points, according to Payne, are "very tiny point[s] in the 
muscle believed to be part of a muscle spindle that is firing 
constantly and causing pain at the sight [sic] and causing 
pain in another area not anatomically related." Payne 
testified that the trigger points were responsible for the pain 
Elcock felt radiating down her right leg to her knee. Payne 
also concluded that Elcock's "pain was severe and it 
interfered with several of her activities," that Elcock would 
be in pain for the rest of her life because of her fall, and 
that the injuries resulting from the fall were permanently 
disabling. 
 
Elcock was also referred to Copemann, a psychologist 
and purported expert in vocational rehabilitation. A 
vocational rehabilitationist assesses the extent of an 
individual's disability, evaluates how the disability affects 
the individual's employment opportunities, and assists the 
individual's re-entry into the labor market. Copemann 
 
                                5 
  
examined Elcock for the purposes of this litigation, but also 
treated her for her chronic pain. As part of his examination, 
he diagnosed Elcock's psychological condition and 
evaluated her lost earning capacity in light of her physical 
and psychological disabilities. Copemann concluded that 
Elcock suffered from depression, pain disorder, and 
adjustment disorder with anxiety, and opined that these 
symptoms were caused by her slip and fall and the physical 
injuries that arose therefrom. Copemann also concluded 
that Elcock's psychological condition was improving and 
was not permanent. Based on his assessment of Elcock's 
psychological condition, the extent of her physical injuries, 
relevant employment factors, and the results of diagnostic 
tests he had performed, Copemann opined that Elcock was 
between 50 and 60 percent vocationally disabled and that 
this disability was permanent. 
 
Except for Ali, all of the doctors mentioned above testified 
at Elcock's four-day jury trial, as did Elcock and her 
husband. Elcock also offered the testimony of Pettingill, 
who gave an expert opinion as to Elcock's lost earning 
capacity. The jury found for Elcock on all elements of her 
tort claim and awarded her $650,000 in damages: 
$350,000 for her economic injuries, and $300,000 for her 
pain and suffering. Kmart moved for judgment as a matter 
of law, for a new trial, or alternatively, for a remittitur. The 
District Court denied the motion for judgment as a matter 
of law and for a new trial, but did remit the pain and 
suffering award to $115,000. Upon Elcock's motion for 
reconsideration, however, the Court vacated the remittitur 
and reinstated the jury's damage award. The District Court 
had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1332. We have appellate 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
II. The Evidentiary Issues Relating to Copemann's 
       Qualifications 
 
Before trial and again during trial, Kmart sought to 
exclude Copemann's vocational rehabilitation testimony on 
the grounds that he was not qualified as an expert in the 
field. The District Court conducted a voir dire on 
Copemann's qualifications, during which Copemann 
testified regarding his credentials, and Kmart's vocational 
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rehabilitation expert gave testimony that called those 
credentials into question. The District Court considered the 
qualifications issue raised by Kmart a "close call," but 
ultimately found that Copemann was qualified to testify 
about vocational rehabilitation.1 Kmart challenges this 
decision. We review the District Court's decision to qualify 
Copemann for abuse of discretion. See Waldorf v. Shuta, 
142 F.3d 601, 627 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 
A. 
 
Federal Rule of Evidence 702, rescribed in the margin, 
governs the use of expert testimony in the federal courts.2 
As explained in In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig. , 35 F.3d 717 
(3d Cir. 1994) (hereinafter "Paoli II"), Rule 702 embodies 
three distinct substantive restrictions on the admission of 
expert testimony: qualifications, reliability, andfit. See id. 
at 741-43. Before an expert witness may offer an opinion 
pursuant to Rule 702, he must first be qualified by virtue 
of specialized expertise. See id. at 741. In Waldorf v. Shuta, 
142 F.3d 601 (3d Cir. 1998), we articulated the standard 
for qualifying an expert: 
 
       Rule 702 requires the witness to have "specialized 
       knowledge" regarding the area of testimony. The basis 
       of this specialized knowledge "can be practical 
       experience as well as academic training and 
       credentials." We have interpreted the specialized 
       knowledge requirement liberally, and have stated that 
       this policy of liberal admissibility of expert testimony 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Copemann also testified about the physical and psychological harm 
that Elcock suffered as a result of her slip and fall. In light of the 
fact 
that Copemann is a formally trained and experienced psychologist, 
Kmart does not challenge his qualifications to render this opinion. 
 
2. The Rule provides that 
 
       [i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will 
assist the 
       trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in 
       issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
       experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form 
of 
       an opinion or otherwise. 
 
Fed. R. Evid. 702. 
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       "extends to the substantive as well as the formal 
       qualification of experts." However, "at a minimum, a 
       proffered expert witness . . . must possess skill or 
       knowledge greater than the average layman. . . ." 
 
Id. at 625 (citations omitted). 
 
Even under the liberal standard described in Waldorf, 
Copemann's qualifications as a vocational rehabilitationist 
are thin. In contending that Copemann possessed skill or 
knowledge "greater than the average layman," Elcock 
focuses primarily on Copemann's experience. Specifically, 
Elcock points to (1) Copemann's general training in 
"assessing" individuals, which he received while earning his 
Ph.D. in psychology; (2) his experience, twenty years 
previous, helping drug addicts reenter the workforce; (3) his 
experience primarily in the last two years dealing with the 
Virgin Islands Division of Workers' Compensation, which he 
had advised regarding the ability of approximatelyfifty to 
sixty-five disabled employees to return to their previous 
jobs; (4) his past experience as an expert witness making 
lost earning capacity assessments; (5) his attendance at two 
seminars regarding vocational rehabilitation, and his stated 
familiarity with the literature in the area; (6) his 
membership in two vocational rehabilitation organizations, 
both of which place no restrictions on membership; and (7) 
the fact that when Copemann was in school, a degree in 
vocational rehabilitation therapy was not available, but that 
he received similar training nonetheless. This last fact, 
Elcock argues, explains why Copemann did not possess the 
degrees or formal training one would ordinarily associate 
with an expert. 
 
In response, Kmart emphasizes several factors that 
significantly undermine Copemann's purported 
qualifications. First, during Kmart's voir dire, Copemann 
admitted that he had neither the academic training nor the 
standard credentials that would ordinarily qualify one as an 
expert in vocational rehabilitation. Moreover, Kmart argues 
that nothing prevented Copemann from either receiving 
formal training in vocational rehabilitation after he left 
school or from earning a related degree or certificate while 
he was in school. Second, Copemann conceded that his 
experience dealing with the workers' compensation board 
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consisted primarily of diagnosing whether patients were so 
disabled that they could not return to a particular job; this 
experience did not include assessing what range of jobs 
those injured individuals were capable of performing. Third, 
Kmart adduced evidence suggesting that not only was 
Copemann's experience as a counselor for drug addicts 
dated, but that it did not include performing assessments 
of which jobs the recovered addicts would be able to 
perform. Fourth, although Copemann maintained that there 
was no difference between a psychologist and a vocational 
rehabilitationist, Kmart's vocational rehabilitation therapist 
testified that despite a common psychological diagnostic 
component in both jobs, the vocational rehabilitationist's 
expertise entails a distinct speciality: the capacity to 
"translate" psychological and physical impairments into the 
"ability to work, earn income, [and] get a job . . . ."3 
 
Kmart's forceful argument all but persuaded the District 
Court. Given Copemann's lack of credentials and limited 
experience, the District Court twice expressed its reluctance 
to qualify Copemann as an expert in vocational 
rehabilitation. However, after two attempts by Elcock's 
counsel to qualify him, the Court eventually admitted 
Copemann's testimony. The Court relied heavily on the fact 
that a formal degree in vocational rehabilitation therapy 
was not available when Copemann attended school, and the 
fact that the training of psychologists was functionally 
similar to that of vocational rehabilitationists at the time. 
The Court also relied on Copemann's practical experience 
evaluating the ability of injured employees to return to 
work. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. In support of this latter point Kmart cites Terry v. Mathews, 427 F. 
Supp. 464 (E.D. Pa. 1976), in which the district court remanded an 
administrative law judge's ("ALJ") decision to deny a social security 
claimant benefits because the ALJ gave great weight to the vocational 
rehabilitation opinion of a trained psychologist with "some limited 
experience in occupational therapy and counseling." Id. at 466. The 
district court reasoned that "the issue here is not a psychological one. 
Rather it is a question of expertise in the vocational field. . . . [I]n 
light 
of [the expert's] qualifications as a psychologist, as opposed to any 
qualifications as a vocational expert, [the heavy weight given the 
expert's 
testimony] is impermissible." Id. 
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B. 
 
This court has had, for some time, a generally liberal 
standard of qualifying experts. See, e.g., Paoli II, 35 F.3d at 
741; Hammond v. International Harvester Co., 691 F.2d 
646, 652-53 (3d Cir. 1982); Knight v. Otis Elevator Co., 596 
F.2d 84, 87-88 (3d Cir. 1979). However, we have also set a 
floor with respect to an expert witness's qualifications. For 
example, in Aloe Coal Co. v. Clark Equipment Co. , 816 F.2d 
110 (3d Cir. 1987), we held that a district court abused its 
discretion in allowing a tractor sales representative to 
testify as an expert regarding the cause of a tractor fire. See 
id. at 114. In making this determination we stated: 
 
       Drewnoski [the expert witness] was not an engineer. He 
       had no experience in designing construction 
       machinery. He had no knowledge or experience in 
       determining the cause of equipment fire. He had no 
       training as a mechanic. He had never operated 
       construction machinery in the course of business. He 
       was a salesman, who at times prepared damage 
       estimates. 
 
Id. (citations omitted); see also Waldorf, 142 F.3d at 625 
("Even though we apply Rule 702 liberally, we have not 
pursued a policy of qualifying any proffered witness as an 
expert."). 
 
Our decision in Waldorf provides guidance for our 
assessment of Copemann's qualifications. In Waldorf, the 
district court qualified an expert with credentials similar to 
Copemann's, and we affirmed that decision on appeal: 
 
        The district court qualified Rizzo [the putative expert] 
       to testify as a vocational expert in spite of his lack of 
       any formal training in that field, and notwithstanding 
       that his educational training culminated in a master's 
       degree in sociology and social organization from 
       Rutgers University in 1973. . . . 
 
        . . . In 1991, he became involved in the Council's 
       administration of a million dollar loan pool to assist 
       disabled New Jersey residents in starting their own 
       businesses. In that capacity, Rizzo evaluated the 
       capacity of disabled individuals to accomplish specific 
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       employment opportunities. Rizzo also testified that, 
       through the course of his employment, he became 
       familiar with studies on the work that quadriplegics 
       can perform. Furthermore in his job experience, Rizzo 
       utilized the New Jersey Department of Labor Statistics 
       and the New Jersey Job Listing Book, which indicate 
       employment opportunities available in various job 
       categories in New Jersey. Thus, based on his 
       experience and his familiarity with the literature in the 
       field, the district court held that Rizzo was qualified 
       properly as a vocational expert. The court said that 
       "[w]hile his formal credentials may be a little thin, he 
       certainly had sufficient substantive qualifications to be 
       considered an expert under the liberal standard of Rule 
       702. 
 
Id. at 626 (citations omitted). 
 
What drove the Waldorf panel's decision to affirm on this 
issue was not the impressiveness of Rizzo's credentials or 
experience, but the standard of review governing our review 
of Rule 702 qualification rulings: 
 
        Waldorf has a heavy burden in challenging this 
       decision because, absent an abuse of discretion, we 
       will not substitute our own judgment for that of the 
       trial court regarding the admission or exclusion of 
       expert testimony. Of course, an abuse of discretion 
       means much more than that the appellate court 
       disagrees with the trial court. Rather, a trial court's 
       determination whether to admit or exclude expert 
       testimony will be upheld "unless manifestly erroneous." 
 
        . . . Even though Rizzo did not possess formal 
       academic training in the area of vocational 
       rehabilitation, he did have experience in the field 
       through his employment at the Developmental 
       Disabilities Council in attempting to provide jobs for 
       disabled individuals. During this time, Rizzo also 
       became familiar with the relevant literature in thefield. 
       Even if his qualifications are, as the district court 
       described, "a little thin," he has substantially more 
       knowledge than an average lay person regarding 
       employment opportunities for disabled individuals. In 
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       the circumstances, we cannot say that the district 
       court abused its discretion in determining that Rizzo 
       possessed the minimum qualifications necessary to 
       testify as an expert. 
 
Id. at 626-27 (citations omitted). 
 
Copemann, like Rizzo, has no formal training in 
vocational rehabilitation and Elcock must therefore rely on 
Copemann's practical experience to demonstrate that he 
"possessed the minimum qualifications necessary to testify 
as an expert." Id. at 627. In support of Copemann's 
qualifications, Elcock points to Copemann's experience in 
helping drug addicts return to employment and to his work 
with the Virgin Islands Division of Workers' Compensation. 
Based on this background, one can presume that 
Copemann has learned about the difficulties disabled 
individuals face in employment, and has accumulated some 
experience in evaluating whether they can return to a 
particular job. Nonetheless, the most fundamental problem 
with Copemann's experience in this area is that he seems 
most qualified to testify on a micro-level regarding the 
ability of a disabled individual to return to a specific job; he 
does not appear particularly qualified to testify on the 
macro-level regarding the number of jobs in the national or 
local economy that the disabled individual is able to 
perform. 
 
On the other hand, Copemann claims to have kept 
abreast of the relevant literature in his field, and to have 
consulted the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, a standard 
tool of the vocational rehabilitationist.4  In addition, 
Copemann possesses a degree in a field tangentially related 
to the one about which he testified, and he has also 
attended conferences regarding vocational rehabilitation. 
Finally, in the process of testifying as an expert in similar 
matters, Copemann has no doubt performed his brand of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The DOT describes "the majority of occupations" in the economy, 1 
U.S. Dep't of Labor, Dictionary of Occupational Titles iii (4th ed. 1991) 
(Message from the Secretary of Labor), as well as the hazards 
accompanying those jobs, see, e.g., Adorno v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 43, 47 (3d 
Cir. 1994), and is often used by vocational rehabilitationists to assess 
what jobs are available to disabled employees. 
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vocational rehabilitation assessments.5  Though his efforts 
in this regard are not grounded in formal training, when 
taken together with his review of the literature in the field 
and his attendance at conferences, we must acknowledge 
that he has "substantially more knowledge than an average 
lay person regarding employment opportunities for disabled 
individuals." Id. at 627. 
 
We consider Waldorf to be at the outer limit of this 
court's generally liberal approach to reviewing the 
qualifications of experts. We also suspect that, had the 
district court in Waldorf ruled the witness unqualified, the 
panel would have affirmed. While Copemann seems but 
marginally qualified to perform a vocational rehabilitation 
assessment, and a district judge would be free to decline to 
qualify him, we recognize that Copemann's qualifications 
fall within Waldorf's outer bounds. Despite misgivings, 
because we are not prepared to say that the District Court, 
acting "on the spot" and exercising considerable care in its 
approach to this question, abused its discretion, we will 
affirm the Court's decision to qualify Copemann as an 
expert. We note, however, that the marginal nature of 
Copemann's qualifications does enter into the Daubert 
calculus, to which we now turn. 
 
III. The Daubert Reliability of Copemann's Testimony 
 
During trial and again on appeal, Kmart sought to 
exclude Copemann's testimony on the ground that his 
methodology for rendering vocational disability assessments 
was unreliable. Kmart repeatedly requested that the District 
Court conduct a Daubert hearing regarding Copemann's 
methods as a vocational rehabilitationist. The District Court 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. We note that the mere fact that Copemann was previously admitted as 
an expert witness qualified to give testimony on vocational rehabilitation 
is irrelevant to the determination whether he is qualified to give such 
testimony in this case. See Thomas J. Kline, Inc. v. Lorillard, Inc., 878 
F.2d 791, 800 (4th Cir. 1989) ("[I]t would be absurd to conclude that one 
can become an expert simply by accumulating experience in testifying."). 
Moreover, while any expertise he may have gained in performing 
vocational rehabilitation assessments in these cases would be relevant, 
the crucible of litigation makes for a poor classroom. 
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denied this request, stating that it "didn't look at" 
Copemann's vocational rehabilitation opinion "as a Daubert 
issue." Although we hold that the District Court erred in 
not granting a Daubert hearing, we acknowledge that the 
Court's refusal to do so is understandable, as the Court's 
decision was rendered before the Supreme Court's opinion 
in Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), 
extended the rigorous gatekeeping function assigned to trial 
judges by Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 
U.S. 579 (1993), to cases involving non-scientific testimony. 
See Kumho, 526 U.S. at 141. 
 
A. 
 
In Daubert, the Supreme Court directed district court 
judges to perform a screening function, to insure that 
evidence presented by expert witnesses is relevant, reliable, 
and helpful to the jury's evaluation of such evidence. See 
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597. Our precedent initially limited 
Daubert's command to cases involving scientific testimony. 
For instance, in In re Unisys Savings Plan Litigation, 173 
F.3d 145, 157 (3d Cir. 1999), cert. denied sub nom., 
Meinhardt v. Unisys Corp., 120 S. Ct. 372 (1999), we stated 
that non-scientific testimony (such as Copemann's)"does 
not fall within the scope of scientific testimony, and 
accordingly, it should not be tested by the particular 
standards required for testimony based on a particular 
scientific ethic." Id. at 157. It was not until Kumho Tire that 
the Supreme Court made clear that Daubert's gatekeeping 
obligation covered not only scientific, but also non- 
scientific, testimony. See Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 151 
(rejecting the "Eleventh Circuit's holding that a trial judge 
may ask questions of the sort Daubert mentioned only 
where an expert `relies on the application of scientific 
principles,' but not where an expert relies `on skill- or 
experience-based observation' ") (citation omitted). 
 
Although we would ordinarily review a district court's 
application of Rule 702, as well as the decision whether to 
grant a Daubert hearing, for abuse of discretion, see Kumho 
Tire, 526 U.S. at 142, 152, our standard of review is 
somewhat different in this case. Because we are evaluating 
the District Court's legal interpretation of a federal rule, our 
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review is plenary. See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation, 
No. 99-1692, 2000 WL 1137475, at *6 (3d Cir. Aug. 10, 
2000). As will appear, a review of Copemann's vocational 
rehabilitation testimony demonstrates the significant 
reliability questions raised by his methodology and compels 
the conclusion that a Daubert hearing would have 
permitted a fuller assessment of Copemann's analytical 
processes and thus was a necessary predicate for a proper 
determination as to the reliability of Copemann's methods. 
See Padillas v. Stork-Gamco, Inc., 186 F.3d 412, 417-18 (3d 
Cir. 1999) (holding that the district court abused its 
discretion in excluding an expert's opinion without 
conducting an in limine hearing focused on the Daubert 
reliability of his testimony). "When a [district] court . . . 
misapprehends [the] bounds" of a federal rule, "it abuses its 
discretion." Id. (citing Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 
100 (1996)); cf. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 159 (Scalia, J., 
concurring) ("Though, as the Court makes clear today, the 
Daubert factors are not holy writ, in a particular case the 
failure to apply one or another of them may be 
unreasonable, and hence an abuse of discretion."). In 
fairness, we note that, because he was without the benefit 
of Kumho Tire, the District Judge understandably 
misapprehended the bounds of Rule 702's gatekeeping 
requirement. Kumho Tire, however, must be applied. 
 
B. 
 
An expert's opinion is reliable if it is " `based on the 
`methods and procedures of science' rather than on 
`subjective belief or unsupported speculation'; the expert 
must have `good grounds' for his or her belief." Paoli II, 35 
F.3d at 742 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589). In cases 
involving scientific testimony, "[the] inquiry into the 
reliability of scientific evidence . . . requires a determination 
as to its scientific validity." Id. (citation omitted). 
 
"Daubert suggests several factors that a district court 
should take into account in evaluating whether a particular 
scientific methodology is reliable . . . ." Id. The factors that 
Daubert and this Court have already declared important 
include: 
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       (1) whether a method consists of a testable hypothesis; 
       (2) whether the method has been subject to peer 
       review; (3) the known or potential rate of error; (4) the 
       existence and maintenance of standards controlling the 
       technique's operation; (5) whether the method is 
       generally accepted; (6) the relationship of the technique 
       to methods which have been established to be reliable; 
       (7) the qualifications of the expert witness testifying 
       based on the methodology; and (8) the non-judicial 
       uses to which the method has been put. 
 
Id. at 742 n.8 (citing Daubert and United States v. Downing, 
753 F.2d 1224, 1238-41 (3d Cir. 1985), as the source of 
those non-exclusive factors). We will henceforth refer to 
these factors as the Daubert factors. 
 
Kumho Tire makes clear that this list is non-exclusive 
and that each factor need not be applied in every case. As 
noted above, it also resolves the question whether these 
same factors should be applied when testing the reliability 
of a non-scientific method: 
 
       Daubert's gatekeeping requirement. . . . make[s] certain 
       that an expert, whether basing testimony upon 
       professional studies or personal experience, employs in 
       the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that 
       characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant 
       field. . . . [T]he trial judge must have considerable 
       leeway in deciding in a particular case how to go about 
       determining whether particular expert testimony is 
       reliable. That is to say, a trial court should consider 
       the specific factors identified in Daubert  where they are 
       reasonable measures of the reliability of expert 
       testimony. 
 
Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152; see also id. at 158-59 (Scalia, 
J., concurring) ("I join the opinion of the Court, which 
makes clear that the discretion it endorses--trial-court 
discretion in choosing the manner of testing expert 
reliability--is not discretion to abandon the gatekeeping 
function."). 
 
Kmart accepts that vocational rehabilitation expertise 
flows from a valid non-scientific method; it disputes, 
however, the reliability of Copemann's particular 
 
                                16 
  
methodology. Kmart points to a number of instances in 
which application of the Daubert factors would weigh 
against the reliability of Copemann's methods. 
 
1. 
 
Kmart first contends that Copemann's method can be 
described, in essence, as an idiosyncratic or subjective 
judgment in which the result can neither be duplicated nor 
tested for validity (implicating by rough analogy, and for 
reasons explained below in this Section, the first and fourth 
Daubert factors, see Paoli II, 35 F.3d at 742 n.8). Given the 
lack of a Daubert hearing, we must turn to Copemann's 
trial testimony in order to identify and evaluate the 
processes Copemann employed in making the disability 
determination in Elcock's case. On direct examination, 
Copemann described his method for arriving at the 50 to 60 
percent disability opinion he rendered: 
 
        My vocational assessment consisted of testing Mrs. 
       Elcock for intelligence level achievement, that is school 
       level, getting a work history on her and then doing an 
       analysis of the Dictionary of Occupational Titles 
       aptitude testing on her, and then doing a search of the 
       Dictionary of Occupational Titles. 
 
       . . . 
 
        [In addition to a clinical interview,] I performed the 
       [Wechsler] Adult Intelligence Scale revised and she had 
       an IQ of 98 which is in the normal or average range. 
       And I also performed the wide range achievement test 
       revised which indicated that she had a reading level of 
       above 12th grade level, spelling level of beginning 10th 
       grade, and an arithmetic level of ending 6th grade. 
 
       . . . 
 
        Then I performed the aptitude testing on her, and I 
       think we need to, I need to explain the aptitude test. 
       Each job in the United States is categorized in this 
       Dictionary of Occupational Titles put out by the U.S. 
       Department of Labor and the characteristics of those 
       jobs. Those jobs are listed, characterized and listed for 
       each job, and every job has a set of aptitudes that tells 
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       you what is needed or what are needed in order to be 
       able to do those jobs. And there are tests that you can 
       give to determine what a person's aptitude are for 
       doing a particular job. 
 
Copemann further testified that he also assessed which 
jobs were available in the local job market by reviewing the 
job listings his office receives weekly from the Virgin Islands 
labor department, and by searching a database his office 
creates of jobs listed in the local newspapers within the 
prior two months. He then stated that he "took into 
consideration [Elcock's] physical injuries and. . . her 
psychological impairments," and, in sum, concluded that 
he "rated [Elcock's] capacity after [he] had done all the 
analysis as somewhere between 50 and 60 percent." 
 
When asked by Elcock's counsel to describe his 
methodology, Copemann testified as follows: 
 
        You take into comparison her education, her 
       intelligence, her aptitude, her previous work experience 
       and her medical injuries, what she says, she would like 
       to do, what her desires are as a person, her 
       temperaments, whether she likes working by herself or 
       she likes working with groups of people, whether she 
       likes working on detailed stuff or she doesn't like 
       working on detailed things because those are 
       important, and her limitations as she states them, not 
       only the medical findings but her limitations as she 
       states them. So when you take all of those things 
       together the closest I could come to it as a 50 to 60 
       percent disability. 
 
       . . . 
 
       [What that disability means] is that she is at a 
       disadvantage when she goes out into the labor market 
       because she's going to be competing with healthier 
       individuals and she's going to be competing with 
       [non-]impaired individuals. 
 
On cross-examination, Kmart made several attempts to 
have Copemann explain how he arrived at the 50 to 60 
percent figure other than his ipse dixit statement that the 
consideration of these factors produced these numbers. 
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Kmart pointed out that, before trial, Copemann had 
diagnosed Elcock's disability at 50 to 75 percent, and asked 
him to explain the discrepancy. Other than to state that his 
initial "estimate was too broad," Copemann did not explain 
why the range changed by 15 percent. Though Kmart might 
have conducted a more thorough cross-examination of 
Copemann on this point, a Daubert hearing would have 
afforded a far greater opportunity to probe the particulars 
of how Copemann arrived at specific disabilityfigures, 
without running the risk of boring or "turning off " the jury. 
Moreover, because Copemann never explained his method 
in rigorous detail, it would have been nearly impossible for 
Kmart's experts to repeat Copemann's apparently subjective 
methods, or, in the nomenclature of Paoli II, to find that his 
"method consists of a testable hypothesis" for which there 
are "standards controlling the technique's operation." 35 
F.3d at 742 n.8. 
 
As suggested above, we can only roughly analogize to 
these two Daubert factors when reviewing the non-scientific 
evidence presented by Copemann. Vocational rehabilitation 
is a social science that does not exactly mirror the 
fundamental precepts of the so-called harder sciences. 
However, the gist of the above Daubert factors are 
nonetheless implicated in this case. Just as a scientist 
would want to duplicate the outcome when evaluating a 
colleague's claim that he had developed a technique for cold 
fusion, a vocational rehabilitationist assessing Copemann's 
disability determination would want to test the underlying 
hypotheses and review the standards controlling the 
technique's operation in an attempt to reproduce the 
results originally generated. 
 
If such testing did not generate consistent results, 
Copemann's method would be exposed as unreliable 
because it is subjective and unreproducible. Moreover, 
without an inkling as to the standards controlling 
Copemann's method--i.e., how he excludes for other 
variables, such as Elcock's pre-existing injuries or job 
limitations--an expert trying to reproduce Copemann's 
methods would be lost. Because Elcock had neither the 
need nor the opportunity to test Copemann's methods in 
this manner, on the present record we conclude that the 
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first and fourth Daubert factors suggest that Copemann's 
method was unreliable and therefore his opinion would not 
"assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue . . . ." Fed R. Evid. 702. 
 
2. 
 
Kmart's second argument is based on the fact that 
Copemann admits that he employed an untested, novel 
method for performing vocational rehabilitation 
assessments that was based on an arbitrary admixture of 
two widely used methods. This contention implicates the 
fifth and sixth Daubert factors: "(5) whether the method is 
generally accepted; [and] (6) the relationship of the 
technique to methods which have been established to be 
reliable . . . ." Paoli II, 35 F.3d at 742 n.8. 
 
Given the absence of a full Daubert hearing, our exposure 
to the mechanics of Copemann's admittedly unique 
methodological approach to vocational disability 
assessment is limited to the brief description Copemann 
offered at trial. On cross examination, Kmart asked 
Copemann to explain the basis of his method and how he 
arrived at a disability rating of 50 to 60 percent. Copemann 
testified as follows: 
 
        I use a combination of the procedure recommended 
       by Fields which is to look at level of preinjury access to 
       the labor market and post injury access and the 
       percentage and the difference between those 
       percentages Fields says is the loss of jobs or the lost 
       percentage. 
 
        I also looked at which is what I normally do at the 
       procedure recommended by Anthony Gamboa and he 
       suggests that you look at all the factors involved in the 
       client's analysis, injury, test results, psychological 
       results, the client's statements, and so on, and then 
       you as the clinician must make a, you as a vocational 
       expert must make an estimate. And so what I do is I 
       use Fields analysis as a starting point and then I revert 
       to Gamboa to depart from Fields to come up with an 
       estimate. 
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Kmart does not dispute that the Fields and Gamboa 
approaches are accepted methodologies in the vocational 
rehabilitation field; what it does challenge is Copemann's 
combination method. Each approach, taken in isolation, 
may very well contain sufficient analytical rigor to be 
deemed reliable. However, we are inclined to view 
Copemann's admittedly novel synthesis of the two 
methodologies as nothing more than a hodgepodge of the 
Fields and Gamboa approaches, permitting Copemann to 
offer a subjective judgment about the extent of Elcock's 
vocational disability in the guise of a reliable expert opinion.6 
 
Moreover, like the plaintiff in Kumho Tire, Elcock not only 
failed to introduce evidence that the particular admixture of 
these two methods by Copemann was "generally accepted," 
as required by Daubert's fifth factor, but she also did not 
demonstrate that this hybrid approach bore a logical 
relationship to the Fields and Gamboa techniques, methods 
that had been "established to be reliable," as required by 
Daubert's sixth factor. Paoli II, 35 F.3d at 742 n.8. What is 
at issue here bears a remarkable similarity to the situation 
in Kumho Tire, in which the Court wrote that 
 
       nor does anyone deny that, as a general matter, tire 
       abuse may often be identified by qualified experts 
       through visual or tactile inspection of the tire. As we 
       said before, the question before the trial court was 
       specific, not general. . . . 
 
        The particular issue in this case concerned the use 
       of Carlson's [the plaintiff 's expert] two-factor test and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. An argument could perhaps be made that Copemann's method 
represents a cross-checking approach that applies the learning of two 
accepted methods. In different circumstances, we have opined that there 
is nothing wrong with cross-checking the results of two accepted 
methods to insure that the outcomes at which one is arriving are 
reliable. See Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy Corp. , No. 00-5053, 2000 WL 
1038142, at *4 n.1 (3d Cir. July 27, 2000) (recommending that in 
awarding attorneys' fees "courts cross-check the percentage award at 
which they arrive against the `lodestar' award method"). We are doubtful 
that such a generous characterization is appropriate for Copemann's 
combination method, but the parties can seek to have that issue 
resolved at the Daubert hearing on remand. 
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       his related use of visual/tactile inspection to draw 
       conclusions on the basis of what seemed small 
       observational differences. We have found no indication 
       in the record that other experts in the industry use 
       Carlson's two-factor test or that tire experts such as 
       Carlson normally make the very fine distinctions about, 
       say, the symmetry of comparatively greater shoulder 
       tread wear that were necessary, on Carlson's own 
       theory, to support his conclusions. Nor, despite the 
       prevalence of tire testing, does anyone refer to any 
       articles or papers that validate Carlson's approach. 
       . . . . Of course, Carlson himself claimed that his 
       method was accurate, but, as we [have] pointed out 
       . . ., "nothing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of 
       Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion 
       evidence that is connected to existing data only by the 
       ipse dixit of the expert." 
 
526 U.S. at 156-57 (citations omitted). Elcock did not 
introduce evidence that Copemann's combination method 
was either used by other experts or even referenced in the 
vocational rehabilitation literature. Moreover, aside from 
the brief statement that he used the Gamboa approach to 
depart from the Fields approach, Copemann offered no 
explanation as to how his hybrid methodology could be 
rationally derived from the application of the two accepted 
techniques. Thus, we conclude that the fifth and sixth 
Daubert factors militate in favor of excluding Copemann's 
testimony. 
 
3. 
 
Third, Kmart points to Copemann's thin qualifications to 
cast doubt on the reliability of his vocational 
rehabilitationist opinion. As we made clear in Paoli II, an 
expert's "level of expertise may affect the reliability of the 
expert's opinion." 35 F.3d at 741; see also id. at 742 n.8 
(listing this element as the seventh Daubert factor). In light 
of our substantial discussion in Section II explaining how 
Copemann's qualifications are marginal at best, and 
mindful of the District Court's statement that the question 
of Copemann's qualifications was a "close call," we believe 
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that this factor also weighs in favor of excluding 
Copemann's testimony. 
 
4. 
 
Finally, we note that Copemann's application of the 
hybrid method he describes appears unreliable on its face. 
On direct examination, Copemann testified that"with or 
without her disabilities," given the jobs available in the 
Virgin Islands, "the only job that [Elcock] could really 
possibly go back to do . . . if she gets motivated enough" 
would be with Mary Kay. "Given . . . her present condition," 
however, Copemann testified that Elcock is "[n]ot now 
[capable]" of meeting the requirements for work as a Mary 
Kay representative. If Copemann had actually employed the 
Fields method as he described it, Copemann would have 
had to conclude that Elcock was 100 percent disabled. 
According to Copemann, a vocational rehabilitationist 
employing the Fields methodology arrives at a job loss 
percentage by comparing the difference between "preinjury 
access to the labor market" and "post injury access." 
Taking Copemann's testimony at face value, Elcock was 
qualified for only one job in the Virgin Islands before her 
injury, and no jobs afterwards. As a matter of "percentage" 
her "loss of jobs" was 100 percent. 
 
Copemann also said nothing to clarify why an application 
of the Gamboa method would have halved this disability 
estimate, as it must have if Copemann ultimately 
concluded that Elcock was between 50 and 60 percent 
disabled. Nor, looking at Copemann's description of his 
methodology, does it seem that a reasonable explanation 
could be provided. Given the disconnect between the stated 
nature of these methods and the results they produced 
when the facts of the instant case were plugged into their 
machinery, we hesitate to say that Copemann's method is 
a reliable one. Though this inconsistency would normally go 
to the weight a jury would give Copemann's testimony, in 
this case the discord is so stark that we factor it into our 
Daubert calculus. Perhaps this inconsistency could be 
sufficiently clarified, but at this juncture, a Daubert hearing 
is the proper forum for such an elucidation. Cf. Padillas, 
186 F.3d at 418 (stating that a district court may abuse its 
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discretion in failing to conduct a Daubert hearing "when the 
ruling on admissibility turns on factual issues"). 
 
Thus, on balance, given the serious doubts raised by 
Kmart regarding Copemann's methods, and in light of 
Elcock's failure to adduce much evidence validating his 
methods, we feel compelled both to vacate the District 
Court's decision to admit Copemann's testimony and to 
remand for a Daubert hearing on this issue. We express no 
opinion as to the outcome of this hearing. On remand, 
Elcock will have an opportunity to substantiate the bases 
underlying Copemann's opinion, and Kmart will have an 
opportunity to impeach or undermine them.7  
 
C. 
 
Lastly, we offer some guidance for remand concerning the 
appropriate role that the challenge to Copemann's 
credibility is to play in the Daubert calculus. We note that 
in reaching our conclusion about the reliability  of 
Copemann's methods, we do not consider evidence 
regarding Copemann's credibility, or his alleged character 
for untruthfulness. 
 
During trial, in an effort to impeach Copemann's 
character for truthfulness and to blunt the force of his 
testimony, Kmart sought to question Copemann about the 
fact that he had engaged in acts of criminal misconduct 
involving dishonesty or false statements. Kmart offered to 
prove that Copemann and the corporation for which he 
served as chief executive officer, Caribbean Behavioral 
Institute, Inc. (CBI), had pled guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. 
S 641, which prohibits "embezzl[ing] . . . or knowingly 
converting to [one's] use . . . any property made or being 
made under contract for the United States . . . ." Kmart 
sought to question Copemann about the fact that he and 
CBI had misappropriated $331,000 from the federal 
government. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. We note that, on remand, the District Court need not conduct a 
Daubert hearing regarding Copemann's ability to testify regarding 
Elcock's psychological harms. The parties do not contest his 
qualifications to render, or his methods for rendering, such an opinion. 
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The fact that Copemann and CBI pled guilty to 
embezzlement and knowing conversion of federal property 
arguably casts doubt on his credibility as a witness, and 
could--under an overly expansive reading of our 
jurisprudence--be an appropriate Daubert factor to weigh 
when adjudging reliability. In In re Unisys Savings Plan 
Litigation, 173 F.3d 145 (3d Cir. 1999), cert. denied sub 
nom., Meinhardt v. Unisys Corp., 120 S. Ct. 372 (1999), 
over a strong dissent by the author of this opinion, a panel 
of this court affirmed a district court's decision not to admit 
the testimony of an expert witness, based in part on the 
fact that the district court found the expert to be not 
credible. See id. at 158. In support of its conclusion, the 
majority contended that the district court could properly 
take into account the expert witness's credibility--and was 
not limited to assessing the reliability of the expert's 
methodology under the Rule 702 Daubert framework-- 
because the expert's "testimony [did] not fall within the 
scope of scientific testimony, and accordingly, it should not 
be tested by the particular standards required for testimony 
based on a particular scientific ethic." Id. at 157 (second 
emphasis added). 
 
Insofar as In re Unisys relied on the now-rejected 
distinction between scientific and non-scientific testimony, 
this part of the majority's opinion was cast into doubt by 
Kumho Tire. Moreover, In re Unisys explicitly limited its 
holding to bench trials, in which "the role of the gatekeeper 
to admit or exclude evidence . . . and the role of the fact 
finder to assess and weigh the evidence that was admitted 
. . . are one and the same . . . ." 173 F.3d at 158. The case 
at bar was not a bench trial and thus, even assuming that 
In re Unisys's holding is still good law, Copemann's 
credibility is and was an issue solely within the province of 
the jury that could neither be considered by the District 
Court when performing its Rule 702 analysis, nor by this 
Court in reviewing that analysis. We thus decline to apply 
In re Unisys here. On remand, therefore, the District Court 
should not consider Copemann's likely credibility as a 
witness when assessing the reliability of his methods.8 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. We note, in addition, that In re Unisys 's holding regarding the 
ability 
of a trial court to factor credibility into the reliability analysis--
especially 
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IV. The Scope of Kmart's Cross-Examination 
       Regarding Copemann's Character for 
       Untruthfulness 
 
The fact that Copemann and CBI pled guilty to violating 
18 U.S.C. S 641 became an issue in the litigation between 
Elcock and Kmart in another respect. During trial, Kmart 
sought to introduce evidence (i) of the fact that Copemann 
and CBI had pled guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. S 641, and (ii) 
that would provide further details about Copemann's and 
CBI's misconduct, including the fact that their crime 
consisted of misappropriating $331,000 from the federal 
government. Kmart also wanted to cross-examine 
Copemann based on the extensive findings of fact made by 
the District Court in describing Copemann's and CBI's 
misdeeds when sentencing the two in the S 641 
prosecution. See United States v. Caribbean Behavioral 
Inst., Crim. No. 99-0012, at 1-14 (D.V.I. Aug. 15, 1997). 
However, in ruling on an in limine motionfiled by Elcock, 
the District Judge, who also presided over the criminal case 
against Copemann, forbade questions regarding the amount 
that Copemann and CBI had embezzled, as well as about 
the facts and circumstances underlying these crimes, 
holding that such questions would be cumulative and 
would add nothing to Kmart's attempt to impeach 
Copemann's veracity. See Elcock v. Kmart Corp. , Civ. No. 
1996-0028F, at 5 (D.V.I. Sept. 23, 1997). 
 
Neither party contests the District Court's admission of 
the pleas. Rule 609(a)(2) provides that "evidence that any 
witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if 
it involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the 
punishment." Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(2) (emphasis added). A 
violation of 18 U.S.C. S 641 is a crime of dishonesty 
because it involves the embezzlement of money. See Fed. R. 
Evid. 609 advisory committee notes (1990 Amendment) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
when it involves the use of a prior conviction to make an ad hominem 
attack on witnesses' believability--has been questioned by at least one 
prominent evidence commentator. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Trial 
Judges--Gatekeepers or Usurpers? Can the Trial Judge Critically Assess 
the Admissibility of Expert Testimony Without Invading the Jury's 
Province to Evaluate the Credibility and Weight of the Testimony, 84 
Marq. L. Rev. (forthcoming Fall 2000). 
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(noting that the House and Senate Conference Committee 
debating Rule 609 stated that " `[b]y the phrase "dishonesty 
and false statement," the Conference means crimes such as 
. . . embezzlement' "), reprinted in Federal Civil Judicial 
Procedure and Rules 389 (West 2000). The District Court 
thus followed Rule 609(a)(2)'s mandate when it admitted 
evidence of Copemann's and CBI's guilty pleas for crimes 
involving dishonesty. 
 
The District Court's discretion to exclude the challenged 
questions regarding the specific acts of misconduct 
underlying these pleas reposes in Rule 608(b). Pursuant to 
that Rule, which is rescribed in the margin, the specific 
acts of misconduct about which Kmart attempted to cross- 
examine Copemann are permissible lines of inquiry to 
impeach a witness's character for truthfulness, but only at 
the discretion of the district court.9  The advisory committee 
notes to Rule 608(b) recognize that, in addition to the terms 
of Rule 608(b), Rules 403 and 611 govern this discretionary 
authority. See Fed. R. Evid. 608(b) advisory committee 
notes (1972 Proposed Rules; Note to Subdivision (b)), 
reprinted in Federal Civil Judicial Procedure and Rules 383 
(West 2000). 
 
Elcock does not contend that Rule 608(b), by its terms, 
mandates the exclusion of this evidence. Instead, she rests 
her argument on the discretion of the District Court to 
forbid lines of inquiry permissible under Rule 608(b). 
Accordingly, as did the District Court, we turn to Rules 403 
and 611. Rule 403 provides that relevant "evidence may be 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. The Rule, in pertinent part, provides: 
 
       (b) Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of the 
conduct 
       of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the 
witness' 
       credibility, other than conviction of crime as provided in rule 
609, 
       may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the 
       discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or 
untruthfulness, 
       be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning 
       the witness' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) 
       concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of 
       another witness as to which character the witness being cross- 
       examined has testified. . . . 
 
Fed. R. Evid. 608(b) (emphasis added). 
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excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed 
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, 
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence." Rule 611 instructs district courts to"exercise 
reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating 
witnesses and presenting evidence so as to . . . avoid 
needless consumption of time." As noted above, the District 
Court excluded the proffered specific-acts line of inquiry 
beyond questions relating to the Copemann's and CBI's 
guilty pleas and the elements of those offenses, because 
inquiries into the facts underlying those crimes would have 
been cumulative and would have "provide[d] little further 
assistance to the jury in evaluating Dr. Copemann's 
credibility." Elcock v. Kmart Corp., Civ. No. 1996-0028F, at 
5 (D.V.I. Sept. 23, 1997). We review this decision for abuse 
of discretion. See Becker v. ARCO Chem. Co., 207 F.3d 176, 
180-81 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 
The amount of money that Copemann and CBI 
misappropriated and the exact way in which they did so is 
certainly relevant to prove the extent of Copemann's 
dishonesty. A juror could rationally conclude that one who 
embezzles a million dollars from the Government over a 
long period of time has a worse character for veracity than 
a person who steals five dollars once. Cf. United States v. 
Geevers, No. 99-5155, 2000 WL 1171976, at *7 (3d Cir. 
Aug. 18, 2000) ("We think that a defendant who falsifies 
checks for large sums of money is more culpable than one 
who does so for lesser sums."). To the extent that they 
paint Copemann's crimes in a more accurate and complete 
manner (as the District Judge did in his sentencing 
opinion), questions relating to the facts underlying the 
pleas are also more probative of untruthfulness than a 
bland reference to a United States Code section or a 
recitation of the crime's elements.10 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. The criminal statute under which Copemann and CBI were 
convicted, 18 U.S.C. S 641, states: 
 
       Whoever embezzles, steals, purloins, or knowingly converts to his 
       use or the use of another, or without authority, sells, conveys or 
       disposes of any record, voucher, money, or thing of value of the 
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In reviewing the trial court record, it is apparent that the 
extent and nature of Copemann's criminal misdeeds were 
somewhat blunted by the fact that Kmart could not ask 
Copemann about the amount of money stolen or the 
lengths to which Copemann went to misappropriate these 
funds. Thus, were we acting as the trial court in the case 
at bar, we likely would have admitted some of this 
additional evidence. However, it was well within the District 
Court's discretion to reach the conclusion it did, as that 
decision was certainly rational and consistent with the 
terms of Rules 403 and 611. The chief probative force of the 
guilty pleas was the fact that Copemann and CBI 
committed crimes of dishonesty, and this evidence came 
out during trial. Filling in the details surrounding these 
crimes would doubtless have taken a fair bit of trial time, 
and would have been cumulative insofar as doing so would 
only result in proving the same points--i.e., that Copemann 
has a character for being untruthful and his expert 
opinions should not be believed. The District Judge, having 
presided over the criminal case, was familiar with the 
complexity of the facts vel non surrounding these crimes, 
and likely had a better sense than we do of what this line 
of inquiry would have entailed. 
 
We give "substantial deference" to evidentiary rulings 
under Rule 403 and other similarly discretionary 
evidentiary rules. Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Dep't, 174 
F.3d 95, 110 (3d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 786 
(2000). Abiding by this standard, we hold that the District 
Court did not abuse its discretion under Rules 403 and 611 
in permitting Kmart to question Copemann only about the 
United States Code section of the crime to which he and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       United States or of any department or agency thereof, or any 
       property made or being made under contract for the United States 
       or any department or agency thereof . . . 
 
       . . . 
 
       [s]hall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten 
       years, or both; but if the value of such property does not exceed 
the 
       sum of $1,000, he shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not 
       more than one year, or both. 
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CBI entered guilty pleas, as well as the elements of that 
offense.11 We note that during the retrial of the damages 
issue on remand, Kmart is free to try to pursue its more 
expanded line of inquiry, and the District Court is 
concomitantly free to forbid such questions for the same 
reasons it did so before. 
 
V. The Evidentiary Issues Relating to 
Pettingill's Testimony 
 
Pettingill, an economist, testified on Elcock's behalf 
regarding her economic losses. He prepared an economic 
damages model that relied on several empirical 
assumptions about the extent of Elcock's injuries, her 
earning capacity before and after the accident, and her life 
expectancy. Kmart challenged each of these assumptions 
before the District Court, and raises those objections again 
on appeal. Kmart, in essence, argues that Pettingill inflated 
each of these figures in rendering his expert opinion, and in 
doing so, rested his damages opinion on assumptions 
wholly lacking foundation in the record. We review the 
District Court's decision to admit Pettingill's testimony for 
abuse of discretion. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Judge Garth does not agree with the majority of the panel that the 
District Court properly exercised its discretion in limiting Kmart's 
cross- 
examination of Copemann. Copemann had pled guilty to violating 18 
U.S.C. S 641 (rescribed in the margin at footnote 10). The extent of 
Copemann's crime was found to be $331,513. Kmart was prevented from 
bringing this fact to the attention of the jury when it cross-examined 
Copemann. Nor could Kmart examine Copemann about the conveyance 
and the disposal of those moneys, all of which was accomplished without 
authority. 
 
As the majority acknowledges, the facts underlying a plea are more 
probative of untruthfulness than merely a recitation of a violation of a 
United States Code section or a recitation of the particular crime's 
elements. While Judge Garth agrees that the District Court is entitled to 
deference when it exercises its discretion, he is of the view that, in 
this 
instance, the District Court abused its discretion by restricting the 
cross-examination of Copemann to the extent that it did. He would so 
hold. 
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A. 
 
We have held that "[a]lthough mathematical exactness is 
not required, [expert] testimony of post-injury earning 
capacity must be based upon the proper factual 
foundation." Benjamin v. Peter's Farm Condominium Owners 
Ass'n., 820 F.2d 640, 643 (3d Cir. 1987). Put another way, 
an "expert's testimony [regarding future earnings loss] must 
be accompanied by a sufficient factual foundation before it 
can be submitted to the jury." Gumbs v. International 
Harvester, Inc., 718 F.2d 88, 98 (3d Cir. 1983). In both 
Benjamin and Gumbs, we held that an expert's lost future 
earnings opinion was too speculative to be presented to the 
jury. In Benjamin, the expert relied solely on the plaintiff 's 
personal assessment of his ability to re-enter the work force 
in assuming that the injured plaintiff would make only 
$10,000 a year as a result of the injuries he sustained. 820 
F.2d at 642-43. We held that this assumption, absent 
"sufficient factual predicates," id. at 642, was a "castle 
made of sand," id. at 643 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). In so doing, we set aside a jury verdict for the 
plaintiff, because the district court failed to exclude the 
expert opinion that relied on this flawed assumption. See 
id. 
 
In Gumbs, we held similarly. The expert in Gumbs 
"calculated the plaintiff 's future earnings loss based on 
plaintiff 's remaining life expectancy of eighteen years rather 
than plaintiff 's remaining work-life expectancy of seven and 
one-half years." 718 F.2d at 98. The expert also assumed 
that, but for his accident, the plaintiff would in the future 
earn twice his average annual income for the four years 
preceding the accident, as well as receive "$1700 in annual 
fringe benefits even though there was no evidence that the 
plaintiff had ever received fringe benefits in the past." Id. 
Reversing on other grounds, we stated that, on remand, the 
expert could not include these assumptions in his 
testimony before the jury, unless the assumptions were 
"accompanied by a sufficient factual foundation. . . ." Id.12 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. Other Courts of Appeals have similarly excluded expert opinions not 
grounded in the facts of a case. See, e.g., Quinones-Pacheco v. American 
Airlines, Inc., 979 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1992) ("Because [the expert's] 
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B. 
 
Turning to the facts of this case, we must examine the 
disputed assumptions that Pettingill used in arriving at his 
lost economic opportunities opinion. Pettingill testified that, 
in preparing his economic damages model on Elcock's 
behalf, he had received a copy of Copemann's report, which 
presumably described Elcock as either 50 to 60 or 50 to 75 
percent disabled. Nonetheless, Pettingill assumed that 
Elcock was 100 percent disabled when arriving at his 
opinion. Pettingill also testified that he was familiar with 
Elcock's past earnings, which were relatively meager. 
Elcock's husband had testified that she worked fourteen 
hours a day as a Mary Kay representative, and the record 
shows that she earned $5,774 in 1995 (before the injury) 
and $1,070 in 1996 (after the injury). Pettingill nevertheless 
assumed, in rendering his opinion, that Elcock would have 
made $6 an hour, working 40 hours a week. Thosefigures 
indicate that Pettingill presumed that Elcock would have 
made a $12,480 a year but for her 100 percent disability, 
more than twice her pre-injury earnings. Pettingill also did 
not discount for the $1,070 that Elcock was still able to 
earn even with her injury. Moreover, although Pettingill at 
one point did suggest that the jury could discount from his 
100 percent disability figure so as to take account of the 
possibility that Elcock was not completely disabled, 
Pettingill persisted in employing the 100 percentfigure. 
 
As did the experts' assumptions in Benjamin and Gumbs, 
Pettingill's assumptions in the instant case lack foundation 
in the record. Though in supplemental post-appellate oral 
argument briefing Elcock has pointed out the fact that in 
the past she had worked, inter alia, as a pastry chef and a 
baker making more than $9 an hour, the underlying data 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
analysis was predicated on an assumption not supported by the record-- 
the assumption that [the plaintiff] suffered from a permanent, total 
disability--the district court did not err in excluding the proffer."); In 
re 
Air Crash Disaster at New Orleans, La., 795 F.2d 1230, 1233 (5th Cir. 
1986) ("We find the economist's `opinion' that the collective loss of 
inheritance for the three children was $1,778,873 to be completely 
airborn[e], premised as it was on assumptions without basis in the real 
world of [the decedents]."). 
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supporting these assertions was not part of the trial record. 
Rather, Elcock failed to adduce evidence at trial (or at any 
time before the District Court) laying a foundation for the 
fact that she could have obtained employment at those 
wages in the Virgin Islands before her injuries. Thus, the 
assumption that Elcock could have earned over $12,000 a 
year when she had only made $5,774 in the year of her 
injury should have been excluded for lack of foundation. 
 
The same can be said of Pettingill's failure to take into 
account the fact that Elcock continued to earn money as a 
Mary Kay salesperson after her injury. According to 
Elcock's tax records, she earned $1,070 in 1996, the year 
after her slip and fall. Pettingill ignored these more concrete 
numbers rooted in the record, which suggest that Elcock 
was not completely disabled, in favor of his arbitrary 100 
percent disability figure. He made similarly questionable 
assumptions about Elcock's life expectancy. In constructing 
his damages model, Pettingill assumed that Elcock would 
live and work to the average retirement age expected of 
African American females. He did not adjust this estimate 
to reflect the fact that Elcock's own expert, Payne, testified 
that Elcock's poorly controlled diabetes could cut her life 
span--and perhaps her working life--short. Ignoring "the 
real world of " Carmelita Elcock renders Pettingill's opinion 
inadmissible. 
 
In sum, we believe that Pettingill's economic damages 
model relied on several empirical assumptions that were 
not supported by the record. Although Pettingill suggested 
to the jury that it might discount the 100 percent disability 
figure that he plugged into his economic model, this 
suggestion is not sufficient to change the result. In the 
absence of clearer instructions or emphasis by the witness 
or the court, a jury is likely to adopt the grossfigure 
advanced by a witness who has been presented as an 
expert. Accordingly, the District Court abused its discretion 
in admitting Pettingill's model as evidence. Cf. Benjamin, 
820 F.2d at 643; Gumbs, 718 F.2d at 98. 13 
(Text continued on page 35) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Interestingly, though the foundation requirement for expert testimony 
is well developed in the case law and in the experience of trial lawyers 
and judges, neither our opinions in Gumbs and Benjamin nor the 
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evidence treatises themselves expressly ground this requirement in one 
of the Federal Rules of Evidence or in the legislative history or advisory 
committee notes accompanying the Rules. Like the case law and trial 
practice governing cross-examination for bias, see United States v. Abel, 
469 U.S. 45, 49 (1984), the foundation requirement is a rule of evidence 
that can only be found in the interstitial gaps among the federal rules. 
 
In these terms, Article VII would likely be the best source for the rule, 
as it governs and is titled "Opinions and Expert Testimony." Rules 702 
and 703 bear on foundation analysis, but neither Rule addresses it in 
explicit terms; nor do the advisory committee notes accompanying the 
Rules. Nonetheless, a lost future earnings expert who renders an opinion 
about a plaintiff 's future economic harm based on economic 
assumptions not present in the plaintiff 's case cannot be said to "assist 
the trier of fact," as Rule 702 requires. This type of an opinion misleads 
the fact-finder and arguably does not comply with the "fit" requirement 
of that Rule. See supra Section II.A (discussing this requirement); see 
also 2 Stephen A. Saltzburg, Michael M. Martin & Daniel J. Capra, 
Federal Rules of Evidence Manual 1272-75 (7th ed. 1998) (detailing Rule 
702 and collecting cases in which courts have excluded expert testimony 
from economists because their damages models did notfit with the facts 
in evidence). 
 
Rule 703 embodies a similar requirement, which does not clearly set 
forth the foundation rule used in Gumbs and Benjamin, but which does 
bear on the analysis inhering in those cases. Rule 703, titled "Bases of 
Opinion Testimony by Experts," provides that 
 
       [t]he facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert 
bases 
       an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known 
       to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably 
relied 
       upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or 
       inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be 
       admissible in evidence. 
 
While these limitations and the notes accompanying them do not 
specifically address the exclusion of expert testimony based on 
assumptions lacking a foundation in the record, it is not a stretch from 
the requirement that other "experts in the particular field" would 
"reasonably rel[y]" on such data in"forming opinions . . . on the 
subject," 
id., to suggest that an expert should not depend on fictional or random 
data when rendering an opinion about the quantum of economic harm 
in a particular plaintiff 's case. Cf. Saltzburg, supra, at 1397-99 
(discussing Rule 703 and collecting cases in which courts have excluded 
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VI. The Jury's Award 
 
Kmart challenges the jury's $650,000 damage award on 
two grounds. First, Kmart contends that Elcock failed to 
adduce evidence sufficient to support a jury'sfinding that 
her slip and fall caused her permanent injuries. Second, 
Kmart argues that both the economic and non-economic 
awards were excessive and should be remitted. 
 
A. 
 
In asserting that Elcock failed to establish causation with 
respect to her permanent injuries, Kmart points primarily 
to inconsistencies in the testimony of Payne, who was 
Elcock's principal witness on permanence, concerning the 
location of trigger points. On direct examination, Payne 
testified that, as a result of her fall, Elcock suffered 
permanent injuries to her back and legs, including trigger 
points in the gluteus maximus that caused pain to radiate 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
expert testimony because the experts unreasonably relied on underlying 
data that was too speculative or not introduced into evidence). Indeed, 
the very title of Rule 703 supports its applicability to foundation 
generally. 
 
Undergirding for Gumbs's and Benjamin 's foundation rule can also be 
found in Article IV of the Rules of Evidence. Rule 402 sets forth a 
liberal 
admissibility standard for "[a]ll relevant evidence," defined in Rule 401 
as 
"evidence having any tendency" to make "more probable or less probable" 
the existence "of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of 
the action." Under this framework, an economist's testimony concerning 
a reliable method for assessing future economic losses can be deemed 
relevant only insofar as a jury can usefully apply that methodology to the 
specific facts of a particular plaintiff 's case. Moreover, Rule 403 
grants 
to the district court the discretion to exclude relevant evidence "if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury." Given the 
realities of litigation, the opinion of a witness impressed by the court 
with the label of "expert" may carry a great deal of weight with a lay 
jury, 
particularly in matters as complex as lost future earnings assessments. 
Permitting such a witness to offer an opinion unsupported by a sufficient 
factual foundation would significantly increase the risk of misleading the 
jury and confusing the issues, the very dangers against which Rule 403 
defends. 
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to her right knee. On cross examination, Kmart impeached 
Payne's testimony by forcing her to admit that, according to 
the leading treatise on the subject, pain caused by trigger 
points in the gluteus maximus would not travel below the 
thigh. Payne acknowledged that her original diagnosis was 
mistaken, but responded by clarifying that Elcock's trigger 
points were in fact situated on the dividing line between the 
gluteus maximus and gluteus medius muscles. Parsing this 
testimony, Kmart contends that Payne has not offered an 
opinion as to causation based on the revised trigger point 
placement, and therefore, that Elcock has failed to produce 
sufficient evidence to support a conclusion that her slip 
and fall caused her permanent injuries. 
 
However, Kmart has ignored the fact that Payne testified 
on redirect examination that her misplacement of trigger 
points did not affect either her opinion regarding the 
permanence of Elcock's injuries or her conclusion that 
Elcock's slip and fall at Kmart caused those harms. Thus, 
while Kmart's cross examination may have poked some 
holes in Payne's trigger point diagnosis, Payne did reaffirm 
her opinion as to the permanence and cause of Elcock's 
injuries. In making its determination as to causation, the 
jury apparently credited Payne's testimony, as it was 
entitled to do. We will not disturb that conclusion. 
 
B. 
 
Kmart also argues that both the economic element of the 
jury's damage award, which includes a recovery for lost 
earnings and lost earning capacity, and the non-economic 
component, which includes a recovery for pain and 
suffering, were excessive and should have been remitted. 
We need not reach Kmart's remittitur argument, however, 
as we remand for a new trial on the issue of damages. Our 
discussion of the defects in Copemann's and Pettingill's 
testimony sufficiently demonstrates the need for a retrial of 
economic damages. Whether the new trial on remand must 
also extend to the non-economic portion of the jury's 
damage verdict presents a closer question. 
 
A partial new trial "may not properly be resorted to 
unless it clearly appears that the issue to be retried is so 
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distinct and separable from the others that a trial of it 
alone may be had without injustice." Vizzini v. Ford Motor 
Co., 569 F.2d 745, 760 (3d Cir. 1977) (quoting Gasoline 
Prods. Co., Inc. v. Champlin Refining Co., 283 U.S. 494, 500 
(1931)). The grant of a partial new trial is appropriate "only 
in those cases where it is plain that the error which has 
crept into one element of the verdict did not in any way 
affect the determination of any other issue." Romer v. 
Baldwin, 317 F.2d 919, 922-23 (3d Cir. 1963) (citation and 
quotation marks omitted). Having looked at the manner in 
which evidence of Elcock's damages was presented at trial, 
we must acknowledge the possibility that the jury did not 
keep the award of non-economic damages distinct and 
separate from the award of economic damages. 
 
For instance, at trial, Copemann offered not only an 
opinion as to Elcock's vocational disability, the basis of her 
recovery for lost earnings and lost earning capacity, but 
also testified about the extent of Elcock's psychological and 
physical injuries, a principal factor in her pain and 
suffering award. In light of Copemann's testimony, the jury 
may have considered it appropriate to base its pain and 
suffering award in part on evidence of Elcock's lost earning 
capacity. There are other possible areas of overlap. Both 
Copemann and Pettingill opined that Elcock was 
substantially, if not completely, impaired in her ability to 
work. Pettingill's lost earnings model assumed that Elcock 
was 100 percent disabled, and Copemann specifically noted 
that, following her injury, Elcock was no longerfit for the 
one job for which she was qualified. From these opinions of 
complete disability, the jury may have inferred that Elcock 
suffered a significant loss in her enjoyment of life, and 
increased her non-economic damage award accordingly. 
 
Because we cannot confidently conclude that theflaws in 
Elcock's evidence of economic damages did not affect the 
jury's determination of her non-economic damages, the 
general presumption against partial new trials recognized in 
Vizzini and Romer guides our decision. We therefore hold 
that a new trial must be had on the entire damage issue.14 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. Given the fact that Kmart has conceded its liability, the new trial on 
remand need not include the liability issue. 
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VII. Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District 
Court will be affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the 
case remanded for a new trial on the issue of damages. 
Parties to bear their own costs. 
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